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How does visual imagination differ from visual 
perceptual experience? And how should we describe 
experiences of visual imagery? Moreover how can 
people who have visual imagery convey what it is like 
to have it to those who have never had it – congenital 
aphantisics? These are difficult questions. The latter is 
particularly difficult if we believe the claim, frequently 
made by philosophers, that if you have never had an 
experience of something, then you cannot know what 
it is like to experience it. For example, if you have never 
experienced colour, then you cannot know what it is 
like to experience colour.
What differences have been proposed between 
visual perceptual experience and visual imagination? 
Philosophers have proposed a few. It has been noted 
that visual imagination is typically voluntary in a way 
that perception is typically not. It has been suggested 
that visual experience conveys to one the existence of 
certain objects and properties, while visual imagination 
does not. Imagination only conveys to one what could 
be the case. However, even if these are true, they fail to 
convey what it is like to have an experience like that.  
David Hume, the famous Scottish Philosopher, said 
that visual imagery is less ‘vivid’ and ‘lively’ than 
visual experience. While to many people these words 
strike a chord, it is not obvious exactly what they 
mean, and what qualities they identify, for perceptual 
experience itself can be more or less vivid or lively 
– compare a visual experience of a bright carnival 
scene and one of a London fog – as can visual imagi-
native experience. So use of these terms seems rather 
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Isabel Nolan, A lion with a thorn in his paw, 2015  
Polystyrene, plaster bandage and papier-mâché,  
109 × 59 × 118 cm
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metaphorical. Moreover, it is not clear that knowing 
these facts about the difference between visual 
perceptual experience and visual imagination – if 
indeed they are facts – helps one to know exactly what 
it is like to have visual imagination if one has not 
had that experience.
However, fortunately, David Hume pointed out a  
counter example to the thesis that if you have never had 
an experience, then you cannot know what it is like to  
experience it. The case is one in which you have not  
experienced something, but you have experienced other 
things that are very similar, which allows you to know 
what it would be like to experience that something in 
question. For example, suppose that you have not seen 
a particular shade of blue. You might come to know 
what it would be like to experience the ‘missing shade 
of blue’ if you had seen very similar shades more or 
less bright, more or less saturated, and more or less 
bluish. Can we use this methodology – identifying 
similar experiences to those of visual imagery – to 
convey to congenital aphantasics what it is like to  
have visual imagery? In this essay I attempt to do so.
Some aphantasics have visual dreams. Is that 
what it is like to have visual imagery? In my own 
experience, some dreams are like imagery to the 
extent that on reflection when one has woken, they 
seemed to be somewhat indeterminate. However, 
certainly at the time I was having I took them to be 
perceptual experience. In any case, some aphantasics 
do not dream. Can we identify experiences that they 
can have that are quite like having visual imagery?
Four examples spring to mind: modal completion, 
neon colour spreading, amodal completion, and  
afterimages. What is common to them all is that  
while you experience them you can also appreciate 
that what you seem to experience isn’t really there,  
as is the case with experiences of visual imagery.
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Isabel Nolan
“One minor revelation was that beforehand I never 
understood those artists who could anticipate exactly 
how they intended a finished work to come together/ 
to look… I’ve always strongly felt it necessary to  
make the work in order to discover what it might do, 
how it will appear. But having nothing to compare  
it to, it’s difficult to understand how mind-blindness 
affects my practice. It’s been tempting to understand 
some of my longstanding interests in, for instance  
the history & philosophy of vision, or the Art of 
Memory as an unconscious preoccupation with 
thematics of the imagination, but many artists are 
interested in this stuff.”
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In modal completion you have a visual experience 
as of an object in virtue of experiencing edges that 
appear to be created by a luminance, colour or texture 
boundary. On reflection, you can tell that there is 
no such boundary and there is not a difference in 
luminance, colour or texture where there appears to 
be one; but, nonetheless, that is what you experience. 
For example, in the Kanizsa triangle figure 1 there 
appears to be a triangle that is lighter in colour than 
the background pointing upwards. If you pay close 
attention to the figure you can recognise that in fact 
there is no difference in lightness between that triangle 
and the background. The luminance contour is an 
illusion. A similar effect can be seen in the black  
disks in the inverted lightness Ehrenstein figure 2, and  
Tse’s Spikey Sphere 3 provides a nice 3-D example. 
Another comparible effect occurs in the two examples  
of neon colour 4, 5 spreading in which you experience 
different coloured disks that you can also appreciate 
are illusory disks – the colour only really forms the 
lines of the figures, and the disks are not really there 
(see p. 24 for all figures). 
In all of these examples, when you realise that the 
shape that you experiences is not really there, you have 
an experience that is somewhat like having visual 
imagery – an experience in which in some sense you 
visually experience something but, in another, you 
realise that something it isn’t in the world before you. 
Nonetheless, despite sharing this one feature with 
imagistic experiences, these examples are far more like 
perceptual experience than imagery in all other respects.
A better example of a perceptual experience that 
is somewhat like visual imagery comes in the form of 
amodal completion. Amodal completion occurs when 
part of an object is experienced as occluded and is 
reported as having a particular shape. It contrasts  
with modal completion as the occluded portion of the  
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1  
Kanizsa Triangle
2
Inverted Lightness  
Ehrenstein figure
3  
Tse’s Spikey Sphere
4
Varin’s Blue Neon Spreading
5  
Neon colour spreading in an Ehrenstein diagram
Hillah Nevo
“I think that my aphantasia is manifested in my 
artistic work in the ‘foggy’ nature or in the lack of 
concreteness of my images. I do not know or cannot 
visualize how things look like so I try to build them 
according to what, as far as I can say, are features  
that do not depend on memory, and these are  
space and lighting.”
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object is not experienced as being defined by a colour,  
lightness or texture boundary. One example is the 
downward pointing triangle in the Kanizsa Triangle 
figure. (see p. 24) There appears to be a whole downward 
pointing triangle occluded by the upward pointing 
triangle that is defined by the illusory lightness 
contours. Yet, in the figure, strictly speaking, there is 
no downward-facing triangle. There are simply three 
black angles that, if connected, would form a triangle. 
Unlike the upward pointing modally completed 
triangle, the downward pointing triangle’s sides do 
not appear within our experience in virtue of a colour 
or lightness boundary. Yet, still, in some sense they 
seem present in our experience. In other words, the 
downward pointing triangle is amodally completed. 
The horizontal and vertical white lines in the Inverted 
Lightness Ehrenstein figure are also usually perceived 
as amodally completed – they appear to continue 
behind the discs – but they are not experienced in 
virtue of an experience of an apparent luminance or 
colour boundary. Likewise, the apparently occluded 
footballer’s long arm provides an amusing example 
of amodal completion.
Like modal completion, amodal completion is  
also somewhat like experiences of visual imagery.  
In some sense you are clearly not seeing an object or 
part of object, yet in another one has a clear visual 
25
F I O N A  M A C P H E R S O N
Alejandro Hernandez Murillo, Mothman Rotten, 2011  
Production notebook, 27.94 × 21.59 cm
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sense of it’s being there. I would say that modal 
completion and dreams overshoot the target of being 
like visual imagery by being too vivid and lively, while 
modal completion undershoots by being less vivid and 
lively than visual imagery – at least my visual imagery. 
But amodal completion is perhaps the most similar 
experience that I can identify to visual imagery. 
One way in which visual imagery can – but 
needn’t – differ from amodal completion is that 
whereas in amodal completion there is a sense of the 
amodally competed part of the object being in front 
of one now – that needn’t be the case with imagery. 
For example, one can visually imagine something 
taking place yesterday and one can visually imagine 
something taking place on the other side of the world 
where one can’t see it. Of course this needn’t be the 
case. One can imagine something happening here  
and in the space visible to one, as I do now when  
I imagine a little green man sitting on the computer 
that I see in front of me.
A final case I’d like to consider is having an after- 
image. When one does so, one often realises that what 
one is experiencing isn’t really present before one. 
Stare at the picture of the magenta circles and 
keep your eyes focused on the central black spot for 
about one minute. Then stare at the black dot in the 
empty frame beside them. Blink your eyes a couple 
of times if required. You should see a green afterimage  
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Alejandro Hernandez Murillo
“When I write, I just tell actions, feelings or atmosphere. 
The reason I write like this is because I can’t see any 
image. So my characters are blurry in my mind.  
I just put them there. I give them a voice, thoughts, 
personalities but nothing physically. 
I am also a filmmaker. I film based on story-
boards I draw to tell the story. But because I do not 
have mind’s eye I use drawings with no details, just 
enough features to recognize one character from 
another and to note the action. I try really hard to  
tell how is the shot going to be.
When I cast a movie I need help from my partner. 
I choose those who act better, but he decides how  
they look physically based on what he ‘saw’ after 
reading my scripts.”
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of a group of circles. Afterimages usually seem to move 
as your eyes move (although the green circles tend 
not to as due to the fixation dot and the surrounding 
black border) and you 
can often tell, even when 
not expecting to view 
an afterimage, that it is 
an afterimage by this 
feature of the apparent 
object. Likewise, one can  
have a photo-realistic 
afterimage by focusing 
your eyes on the dot on  
the bridge of the nose  
of the strangely coloured  
face picture for around one minute and then looking  
at a white surface, like a wall or piece of paper – again 
perhaps blinking one’s eyes a few times. What it  
is like to see these afterimages is not exactly like  
what it is like to visually imagine green circles or  
Amy Winehouse’s face – like modal completion they 
seem more vivid and lively than visual imagination – 
but it is certainly more like imagery than a standard 
visual perceptual experience of those things.
Can we identify other experiences that are like 
imagery? Can we come up with better descriptions of 
how visual imagery and visual perceptual experience 
differ? These are questions that I will continue to  
consider. However, I hope that the experiences 
discussed in this essay help those who have never 
experienced visual imagery to better understand  
what it is like to have it.
In closing, I would like to discuss a feature of  
aphantasia that people who lack it often seem 
surprised by. People with aphantasia can do many tasks 
that people who have visual imagery seem to do in 
virtue of having that visual imagery. People who can  
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Dominic Mason, Untitled, 2018  
Video, variable dimensions
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visualise can be surprised that aphantasics can do these 
tasks when they don’t have the imagery that apparently 
allows those who have such imagery to do them. For  
example, people who can visually imagine might wonder 
how someone can know the number of windows in 
their house when they can’t visually imagine walking 
round their house and counting them. How can 
they know what colour their partner’s hair is if they 
can’t form a visual image of their partner? (Indeed, 
switching modalities from vision to hearing, there 
is a long history in thinking that one cannot think 
unless one has auditory imagery of a voice in one’s 
head.) However, the surprise of those who have visual 
imagery comes from, somewhat ironically I think, a 
lack of (non-perceptual) imagination, for there are 
many questions that those with visual imagery know 
the answer to without having to form visual images. 
If you have visual imagination, think to yourself how 
you know what the sum of two plus two is. It is likely 
that you do not need to visually imagine two objects, 
or imagine the numerals, in order to come up with 
the answer – you just know it. Or think how you know 
what your partner’s name is. You don’t need to visually 
imagine your partner or the letters that make up their 
name to know – you just know. The answer just pops 
into your head. This, according to the reports I have 
read and heard from aphantasics, is what it is like for 
them when they come up with answers to questions 
that those with visual imagery would answer by 
consulting their visual imagery. Thus it is perhaps not 
such a surprising phenomenon as some would make 
out. Importantly, it also raises the fascinating question 
of whether the visual imagery of those who have it 
actually plays the role of allowing them to come to 
know the answer to certain questions, which those 
people believe it does, or whether, counterintuitively, 
it is a mere accompaniment to their so doing.
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Dominic Mason
“The realisation that I had aphantasia had a huge 
impact on the understanding of my practice, and  
shed light on the reasons for differences I was all  
too aware existed between my working methods  
and those of many of my peers.
For me, planning projects, or communicating 
ideas to curators or peers has always been 
problematic – something that really makes sense  
to me now in relation to aphantasia. I’ve always  
felt that the work has revolved around a truth or  
core, that has been tantalisingly just out of reach,  
and now realise that aphantasia is potentially a  
missing piece in this jigsaw.”
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What aphantasia and other examples show 
us is that there are a variety of fascinating mental 
differences between people, which confer different 
abilities to them. Studying these allows us to find 
about each other and ourselves, and to gain a better 
understand of our minds and the nature and role of 
different forms of consciousness.
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